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SUMMARY: The author in this paper considers the question of the use of indices of concentration and competition 
in the banking market. As example he chose the Serbian banking sector during the second half of the 2010s. The analyses 
are based on the data of bank financial statements for relevant years, as well as the results of other researchers. Тhe 
traditional concentration indicators (CRn and HH indices) are used, as well as the Gini coefficients and Rosenbluth and 
Tideman-Hall index and coefficient of entropy. At the end author calculated Linda Indices, the rarely used indicators not 
only in Serbia, and new Svetunkov’s approach and coefficients of the model based on Gauss exponential curve. The 
concentration degree in all cases is calculated based on five variables: total assets, deposits, capital, bank operating income 
and loans. Although these variables are highly correlated, the results show relatively important differences of its use. In the 
case of such variable as capital, the Linda indices suggested the existence of an oligopoly structure. In conclusion, it was 
demonstrated that in the case of the relatively large number of banks in Serbia, the existing concentration degree is 
generally moderately low, which provides suitable conditions for the development of healthy competition among them. At 
the end, there is necessary to emphasize different capability of information respective indicators and its different 
discriminative power. In future research this is fact that is it undoubtedly necessary particularly not to ignore. 
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In modern economic theory as well in economic policies of many countries competition is one of the 
most popular and most frequently used terms. The end of 20
th
 and beginning of 21
st
 century often are 
denoted as the competition epoch of global importance. Modern economic thought is united in 
believing that a competition is a factor that provides the efficiency of market economy. The concept of 
competition is universal model that is used not only in economics, but also in sociology, anthropology, 
theory of games and other sciences and scholarly disciplines. But, despite two and half century 
tradition (Adam Smith is considered as a founder of the theory of competition), theoretic thought not 
yet succeed to build one undisputed, universally accepted, definition of competition: many aspects, 
phenomena and facts linked to competition stil challenge the researchers. One of such questions is how 
to measure the competition, which can be considered as one of the central question of the whole theory; 
it is also important when it comes to the practical use of results of the theory (say, in conducting of 
antimonopoly, i.e. competition policy). 
 The last few decades have seen considerable attention being paid to the analysis of 
development of market competition and affirmation of market principles. This coincided with the 
collapse of planned economies and the beginning of their transformation into market economies. In 
emerging market economies, one of the most important problems was the building of a new, market-
oriented financial system, with a new role of the financial and banking institutions. As a result, the 
question of the evolution of the financial system, still remaining outside the mainstream neo-classical 
modeling, has come to the top of research work [Rybczynski 1997]. Consequently, considerations of 
the conditions for building the market circumstances are characteristics not only in the so-called real 
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economy sector but in other branches, as well. Among these other branches, which are infrastructural 
both at the state level and at the international economic level, the banking sector is of particular 
interest. Its importance has been growing not only in the countries of the former socialist world, which 
is related to the hugely increasing role of the market and the consequent deregulation in this and other 
sectors, but also in developed countries, where deregulation and liberalization processes have also 
taken place, followed by an integration (mergers and acquisitions) of banks. At the same time, the 
developed financial markets, especially European ones, have become more market-oriented [Rajan and 
Zingales 2003]. 
 Modern economic theory assumes that in order to create an efficient market system in all 
segments of the economy, especially in the banking sector, it is necessary to provide a competitive 
environment. It is argued that the potential benefits of competition in banking are similar to its benefits 
for other industries, such as: it can improve allocative, productive, and dynamic efficiencies (e.g. by 
promoting innovation), with the ultimate benefit being stronger economic growth [Northcott 2004]. 
These problems were the subject of many research, some of them are demonstrated in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Positive and negative effects of bank competition 
Author(s) Year Effects of bank competition: Conclusions 
Petersen M. and Rajan R. 1995 In highly concentrated markets, small-business loans are more 
accessible, and in addition to that, new companies can take out loans 
with lower interest rates. 
Jayaratne J. and Strahan P. 1996 Salaries and production grow faster after new bank branches can open 
unrestrained, therefore we can conclude that banking competition has 
a positive effect on the economic growth. 
Shaffer S. 1998 Household income grows faster in areas with a larger number of 
banks. 
Black S. and Strahan P.* 2000 The number of new companies and business associations is smaller in 
areas with higher market concentration. 
Collender R. and Shaffer S. 2000 While the effect of market concentration on household income 
between 1973 and 1984 was negative, it became positive between 
1984 and 1996. 
Bonaccorsi D. and Dell’ Ariccia 
G.* 
2000 The start-up scene is more active in the markets with a concentrated 
banking sector. 
Dell’Ariccia G.** 2000 Concentration in banking sector has negative effects on economic 
growth. 
Cetorelli N. 2004 Sectors in which old companies ask more finances they are 
disproportionally big sized, if they are in countries where banking 
sector is more concentrated. 
Deidda L. and Fattouh B. 2005 Banking concentration exerts two opposite effects on growth: it 
induces economies of specialization, which is beneficial to growth, 
and it results in duplication of banks’ investment in fixed capital, 
which is detrimental to growth. 
Bergantino A. and Capozza C. 2012 Bank concentration promotes entrepreneurship; however, an 
excessive level of concentration becomes harmful. The positive effect 
of concentration decreases for high-technology-intensive sectors. 
* Mimeo, in: [Моисеев 2008]; ** Mimeo, in: [Cetorelli 2004]. 




 Competition in the banking sector is one of the forms of market competition. It appeared later 
than competition in industry, but it is characterized by a high intensity and a great diversity of forms 
and methods. The main characteristics of banking competition are described in detail in [Коробова 
2006: 76–100]. Shortly, we can say that the perfect competitive environment in the banking sector has 
the three main characteristics: (1) there are a large number of banks in the market; (2) banks offer a 
homogenous product with regards to the cost and attribute of the product; (3) the cost for new banks to 
enter the market is very low [Tan 2016: 56]. 
 
 
SOME REMARKS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN BANKING SECTOR IN SERBIA 
 
Building a market economy and the affirmation of the market principles of doing business are among 
the main tasks in all countries undergoing transition. In parallel with the efforts of the legislative 
authorities and bearers of economic policy, these tasks are also reflected in theoretical and practical 
interests at the academic level, where a growing number of papers in various types of scientific 
publications tackle the appropriate problems. Although the problems of building market relations have 
not been unknown in Serbia, i.e. Yugoslavia, since the 1950s – unlike in other so-called socialist 
countries – the country still, due to a combination of certain circumstances launched the process of 
transition practically much later than aforementioned countries. Regardless of certain, not minor 
controversies regarding the nature of socialist market relations at the time, the multi-decadal experience 
of their existence and activity was not adequately assessed and evaluated, while current titles did not 
even use it. Instead, the approach of not speaking about the subject was accepted, also seen in the 
official documents of the highest international organizations
1
, or complete disdain. How much that 
approach contributed to the results achieved is a question that is probably still too early to expect an 
answer to, but it is also a question that is beyond the subject of research in this paper. It merely serves 
as grounds for noting that Serbia entered into the transition process without acknowledging and 
evaluating its previous experience. 
 The aforementioned statement was certainly relevant to and reflected on the reforming and 
development of the banking system. Although they had until then been treated as a “service for the 
economy,” with strong interference of the political establishment, banks, like the rest of the economy, 
were familiar with the market principles of doing business and had partly been exposed to them. But 
not even this was the point at which past experience was evaluated. After the political changes that took 
place in 2000, the Serbian banking sector also underwent some great and significant changes. At the 
begin of 2001 86 banks operated in the territory of Serbia, but that same year 23 banks were stripped of 
their operating licenses, which, along with some other changes, reduced the number of banks to 49 at 
the end of the year [Bankarski sektor SRJ 31.12.2001, 2000: 1–2]. Right at the start of 2002, 
bankruptcy proceedings were initiated in four large banks (Beobanka AD Beograd, Beogradska banka 
AD Beograd, Investbanka AD Beograd and Jugobanka AD Beograd), which, combined, accounted for 
more than 57% of the balance sheet total. 
 
                                                          





Figure 1.Number of banks and employees in the Serbian banking sector 2001–2019 
Source: Bankarski sektor 2002, Banking Sector in Serbia. Quarterly Report. (2010–2019) 
 
 The changes continued in the next years: the once biggest banks ceased to exist (they were 
liquidated), some foreign banks entered the market, there were a few acquisitions etc. On the whole, 
there is a noticeable trend of decline in the number of banks, which mainly happened through merger 
and consolidation processes, and only in exceptional cases through the revoking of an operating license 
by the National Bank of Serbia
2
. The process of foreign capital penetration into the banking sector 
unfolded simultaneously with those changes, incited precisely in 2001, when the National Bank of 
Yugoslavia granted operating licenses to five foreign banks: Micro finance bank AD Beograd, 
Raiffeisenbank Yugoslavia AD Beograd, Alpha bank AE (Belgrade affiliation), HVB bank Yugoslavia 
AD Belgrade and the National bank of Greece (Belgrade branch). At the end of 2019, there were 26 
banks in the market, none of them having a particularly large market share. For small countries like 
Serbia, it is a considerable number, and it provides for the development of competition. Foreign banks 
entering the market and the processes of deregulation and liberalization have naturally created a 
tougher competition on the banking market. However, there are seemingly no serious and consequent 
analyses of competition in the market in question. The competition in this sector has not been of 
particular interest to researchers in the past, although Serbia (Yugoslavia) had, unlike other socialist 
countries, considerably developed market relationships, at least in the real sector. Therefore, the most 
extensive and comprehensive monograph [Begović et al. 2002] does not consider the competition in 
this sector.  
 The number of banks and employees in the banking sector in the period between 2001 and 
2019 is shown in Figure 1. Both the bank and employee figures have decreased substantially in the 
present decade, by more than 10% and 20% respectively. However, both figures are still considerable 
for Serbia’s relatively small financial market. According to the Quarterly Report for the 4
th
 quarter of 
2019, out of the total number of banks, 7 are domestic while 19 are foreign. The domestic–foreign ratio 
in total assets is 24.3:75.7, and in capital it is 25.6:74.4. The total number of business units (all forms of 
business network parts: corporate offices, subsidiary banks, branch offices, counters and other business 
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 Besides the case of the four aforementioned banks, which were stripped of their operating licenses in 2002, Marinković 
lists three such cases from the first half of the first decade: Raj banka Beograd, Kreditno-eksportna banka Beograd and MB 
banka Niš. [Marinković 2007: 284]. 
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units) amounts to 1,598 in 2019. The total number of business units has also decreased in previous 
years. It amounted to 1,719 at the end of 2016, 1,627 at the end of 2017, and 1,598 at the end of 2018. 
 
 
SOME METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Competition in general and especially in the banking sector, is a complex process difficult to measure, 
since there is no generally accepted or optimal approach to measuring it, nor is there a single indicator. 
In the lack of satisfactory answer to question what is the competition and how to measure it, oftens the 
relative estimates on nonquantitative scale are used – strong competition, moderate competition, weak 
competition and so on. As a basis for such type of estimation the expert assesments are used, as well as 
sociological questionnaires, or the results, i.e. aftermaths of competition. Principally, the researchers 
can access different indicators, that are used for the achieving such estimates, including the data about 
prices and costs. But, the key, internal data in most cases are not accessible. Therefore the researchers 
must be satisfied with the data about the results of the competition struggle in the market, i.e. its 
aftermaths. As such results appeare the number of firms in market, its incomes and profits, i.e. assets 
and capital, and on the basis of that the shares of participants in market in observable variables, that are 
achieved just in the competition process. Of course, this is usable also for the profit rate in any branch. 
 These determine two basic approaches, which have been developed in order to measure the 
degree of competition in a market: direct and indirect approaches. Direct approaches are based on the 
degree of market power, as a source of addition to the market price. The direct estimation assumes the 
existence of data on bank service prices and their marginal costs, which is often lacking. In those cases, 
the indirect estimation method is used. 
 The method of indirect estimation is one of the most often used approaches in estimating the 
competition degree in the market. It begins just from the realized shares of market participants, and 
estimates the competition on the basis of distribution of these shares between the participants in the 
market. The logic in this approach is simple: as well the concentration is lesser, so the participants in 
the market have lesser market power, and so the possibility for the development of competition is 




that shows inverse relation between competition (L) and concentration (C), where this relation is 
assumed as linear. This assumption is extremly simplified, and basically not correct, because the 
researches are shown, that this relation is different. But, it is yet necessary to accept this assumption, 
because the nature of this relation is not explained [Воробьёв and Светуньков 2016]. 
 The indirect method of estimation can be structural and nonstructural. The structural 
approach is based on the paradigm “structure–behavior–result” and suggests using the market 
concentration degree to measure the degree of competition. The structure–conduct–performance (SCP) 
paradigm, also known as the Bain/Mason paradigm or concept, has been a very popular model in 
industrial economics since the Second World War. It is largely empirical, i.e. it relies on empirical data 
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but for the most part, lacks a theoretical base
3
. Of course, the SCP was not originally developed for 
banks. But, applied to this sector, the SCP paradigm means that a change in the market structure or 
concentration of banking firms affects the way banks behave and perform: 
 
Structure → Conduct (higher prices) → Performance (higher profits) (2) 
 
where it is assumed that a concentrated market allows firms to set prices (e.g. relatively low deposit 
rates, high loan rates) which boost profitability, i.e. the bank profit rate. 
 Contrary to this approach, the Relative Efficiency Hypothesis (RE) assumes that some firms 
are enormously profitable because they are more efficient than others. In other words, efficiency is 
exogenously determined, i.e. the hypothesis postulates that market concentration is a result of firms’ 
superior efficiency, which leads to larger market share and profitability. The hypothesis states that the 
causality goes from greater efficiency, lower prices and higher concentration/market share: 
 
Efficiency→Conduct (Higher Output and/or Lower Prices)→Market Share→Performance (Higher Profits) (3) 
 
and can be linked to the X-efficiency (hypothesis): some firms have superior management or 
production technology, which makes them relatively more X-efficient with lower costs. Several authors 
have tested this hypothesis in various studies of the banking industry, but results are generally mixed, 
see for example [Evanoff and Fortier 1988]. 
 The nonstructural estimation denies the correlation between concentration and competition, 
especially in systems with low entry and exit costs (contestable markets, see [Baumol 1982]). Within 
this approach many models examine the relationships between banks’ performances depending on 
different exogenous factors (models of Panzar-Rosse, Boone and others). 
 Although we don’t identify competition with concentration, our approach can formally be 
considered as structural. Forasmuch this research is one of the first steps in competition analysis of the 
banking sector in Serbia, we will not apply this approach in ordinary sense. After all, concentration 
coefficients can also be used in the nonstructural approach. We can define concentration as it is defined 
in the OECD Glossary: “Concentration refers to the extent to which a small number of firms or 
enterprises account for a large proportion of economic activity such as total sales, assets or 
employment” [Khemani and Shapiro 1993], without considering different contexts, which are observed 
by the Glossary. 
 
Choice of the variables 
 
Before carrying out an appropriate empirical analysis, some issues are to be resolved. The first of them 
pertains to the variables relative to banks and their business that are to be used. While in the case of 
manufacture and other branches in the real economy sector this issue is less or more solved, the 
situation is different in the banking sector: variables such as volume of production or sales cannot be 
used. Therefore, other indicators are necessary and were used. They can be, for instance, attracting 
                                                          
3
 For the theoretical background of the SCP paradigm, see for example: [Hannan 1991]. 
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deposits [Berger and Hannan 1989], assets [Маринковић 2007] assets and deposits [Berger et al. 
1999], assets, loans and deposits [Vuković 2006] and [Ljumović et al. 2014], total assets, net interest 
income and capital [Eraković 2017], deposits and loans to legal and physical persons [Коцофана и 
Стажкова 2011], deposits, loans to legal and physical persons and assets [Ракша 2010], deposits, loans 
to legal and physical persons and capital [Lončar and Rajić 2012], assets, capital, loans, deposits, 
interest income and net profit (loss) after tax [Miljković et al. 2013]4. Finally, the National Bank of 
Serbia’s regular quarterly reports [Банкарски сектор у Србији. Квартални извештај, 2010–2020] 
provides short surveys of concentration and competition in the banking sector, using nine financial 
balance variables: assets, loans (total), loans to the population, loans to companies, deposits (total), 
deposits of the population, income (total), interest income, income from fees and commissions. 
 As we can notice, the most frequently used variable is total assets, although its use does not 
exclude other variables. We will also not limit our research to using only one variable, therefore we 
have chosen five indicators: total assets (X1), deposits (X2), capital (X3), operating income (X4) and 
loans (X5). In our previous articles we used all five these variables, or three of them, e.g. [Буквић 
2020]. Our choices are due not only to theoretical reasons, but also to the sources accessible to the 
author: bank financial statements available on the website of the National Bank of Serbia [Биланс 
стања/успеха банака, 2020]. In this paper we will analyze the data from the balances of Serbian banks 
during the period of second half of 2010s for all five aforementioned variables. 
 Although the problem of the choice of variables can be seem of great importance, the data we 
analyzed in previous articles listed in literature suggest that this is not so. The correlations between the 
selected indicators (see Table 2) are very high, and the differences practically negligible. The 
coefficients between capital and other variables are the smallest, which can be explained by the nature 
of capital as the residual variable, as we will see further on. Of course, these coefficients are also very 
high. But, as we shown in [Буквић 2020] such conclusion is not absolutely correct, the correlation 
coefficients are not enough for explanation of these complex question. 
 
Table 2. Correlation coefficients for the selected variables X1-X5 in 2016, 2018 and I-IX 2020 
 2016 2018 2020 
 
X2 X3 X4 X5 X2 X3 X4 X5 X2 X3 X4 X5 
X1 0,9975 0,9548 0,9923 0,9807 0.9979 0.9516 0.9894 0.9652 0.9988 0.9636 0.9847 0.9759 
X2  0,9327 0,9910 0,9720 
 
0.9315 0.9856 0.9551  0.9497 0.9825 0.9719 
X3   0,9432 0,9549 
  
0.9470 0.9437   0.9577 0.9472 
X4    0,9719 
   
0.9679    0.9610 
Source: Based on Financial Statements, http://www.nbs.rs/internet/cirilica/50/50_5.html 
 
 
Choice of the concentration indicators 
 
The second methodological question is the choice of concentration indicators (indices). Among the 
many indicators, see for instance [Curry and George 1983] for standard used measures and [Martić 
1986] for many indicators, two have been most often used by researchers and by the practical anti-
                                                          
4
 A review of literature about the use of concentration measures in the banking sector until the beginning of the 2000s is 
given in [Bikker and Haaf 2002b]. 
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monopoly policy: coefficients of concentration, or concentration ratios CRn (the share of n largest 
companies in a certain market, where n mostly stood for 4) and the HH Index (Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index, or simply Herfindahl Index
5
, the sum of the squares of the shares of all participants’ in a 




where: Qi = volume of company production, Q = total production volume in an industry branch. Of 
course, the share (4) can be expressed as percent. Instead of the volume of production, other variables 
can be used, as it often occurs even in analyses within the real economy sector, for example income or 
company assets etc. The oldest and most commonly used of all indices is the CR-firm concentration 
ratio, defined as the cumulative share of the n greatest shares, as follows: 
 
 . (5) 
 
CRn is extremely simple to be calculated, but the choice of n is arbitrary, and n very vary in different 
studies. It focuses on the “nucleus” of the market, and “periphery” for them is not of interest
6
. 
 The HH coefficient (index) is defined as the sum of share squares of all participants in a 
market: 
 
 . (6) 
 




where σ2 is dispersion of market shares si. Therefore it is clear to see, that in the case of perfect 
competition this index has (minimal) value equal to 1/n, also the number of participant in market 
determines the range of the values of coefficients [1/n, 1]. On the other side, from (7) allows that 
myriad of combinations σ2 and n exists, which can result to same value of coefficient, and these makes 
its applicability very questionable. But, despite of that, it is used in practice of antimonopoly 
authorities, even in developed countries. 
 We will also use these indices. But, unlike the aforementioned work [Ljumović et al. 2014], 
where the indices CR4 and CR8 were used, we will use both these indices and also the CR3 index. We 
consider, and this has been demonstrated on multiple occasions, that the CR8 index is too high for 
Serbia and therefore insignificant for the purpose of our work. All the more so that it can be said for the 
coefficient CR10, which uses National Bank of Serbia, together with CR5. 
 The advantages and disadvantages of the indicators (5) and (6) are described in the relevant 
literature, see for example [Буквич 2015]. Therefore, for the more precisely and comprehensive 
                                                          
5
 We ignore the disputed problem of the 'paternity' of this index. 
6
 The terms “nucleus” and “periphery” of the market were used in the usual sense, not strictly considered, as in the works of 
Motokhin and Smaragdov, see for example [Смарагдов et al. 2015]. 
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analyses it is necessary to use other indicators. Besides the aforementioned indices, we will also use the 
Gini coefficient, another frequently used method of assessing the degree of concentration. Out of the 





where si denotes shares (4), while N is the number of observed units (in our case – banks). This 
procedure is the inverse of the usual presentation (and calculation) of the Lorenz curve and the Gini 
coefficient, as it arranges the appropriate line into a descending one, thus the resulting graphical image 
is doubly symmetric relative to the regular Lorenz curve – diagonal from (0.0) to (1.1) and vertical. 
 Like a Hirschman-Herfindahl coefficient, Gini coefficient is characterized with variability of 
results, i.e. there are different configurations of market shares that as result can produce same value of 
coefficient. On the other side, the degree of competition, i.e. the limits between different market 
statuses, is here also arbitrary. So, by some opinions, values of coefficient bellow the interval of 0.6–
0.4 characterize high competitive markets, although there are the others that consider it as not based 
upon and correct, see for example [Смарагдов и Сидорейко 2015]. 
 We note that Hirschman-Herfindahl coefficient (6) sum the squares of market shares, what in 
fact means that market shares are pondered with its values. It is clear that this gives greater significance 
to greater shares, i.e. to stronger market participants. This is sometime emphasized as a lack of this 
indicator. But, more important is that index HH not provide unique relation between the distribution of 
shares and degree of concentration, so it can have same value for very different configuration of market 
shares [Смарагдов и Сидорейко 2015]. Therefore it was many attempts to make diverse weights in 
summing of market shares. Among them Rosenbluth and Tideman-Hall indices stand forward. 
Rosenbluths coefficient summing all market shares (arranged to descending order), but ponder it with 
appropriate ranks, while coefficient is calculated by the formula [Bikker and Haaf 2002]: 
 
 . (9) 
 
 At the same manner Tideman-Hall coefficient is constructed [Hall and Tideman 1967] 
 
 , (10) 
 
but the shares are here arranged to ascending order. 
 Also, the coefficients (9) and (10) differ from HH coefficient through the weights of market 
shares of market participants. While the last, as well were emphasized, ponder in fact the shares with its 
own shares, in coefficients (9) and (10) weights are the ranks of these shares in their arranged group, in 
one case into descending and in other case in ascending order. 
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 One of, in our circumstances, rather used measure of concentration is coefficient of entropy. 
It is defined as [Lipczynski et al. 2017] 
 , (11) 
and it is in fact inverse coefficient: coefficient (11) has so lesser values as the concentration is bigger. 
Minimal value CE=0 coefficient achieves in case of perfect monopoly, and maximal value in case 
where all firms have same market shares (si=sj, i,j∈<1,2,…,N>), but this maximal value is not unit and 
amount ln(N). This situation makes coefficient of entropy not appropriate to the need of comparison of 
sets with different size, therefore appeared the need for standardization of coefficient (11). For these 
purposes it is necessary to divide the expression (11) with ln(N), so we get the coefficient of relative 
entropy 
 , (12) 
so the values of them are in interval [0,1]. 
 The other coefficients of this type (coefficient of variation, Horvath’s, Hanna-Key, Davis’ 
and others) are used significantly rather, and we will not here they consider. 
 We included both of these indicators (5) and (6) in our calculations, also the Gini coefficient 
(8) and Rosenbluth and Tideman-Hall indices (9) and (10), as well as the coefficients of entropy (11) 
and (12). In addition to that, considering their disadvantages, we chose one more index used in Serbian 
literature only in our works, but also rarely used in other countries, especially in the so-called transition 
economies. One of the examples of its uses [Коцофана и Стажкова 2011] refers just to the banking 
sector in Russia. This index (more precisely, the system of indices) is calculated by following a general 




 This index was constructed by EU Commission consultant Rémo Linda [Linda 1976]. As 
well as the CRn index, it is only calculated in case of the few (m) largest enterprises and, therefore, also 
analyzes the “nucleus” but not the “periphery” of the market in question. However, unlike the CRn 
concentration ratio, the Linda index (L-index) focuses on the differences in the market “nucleus”. In 
other words, the L-index has to be considered in combination with the concentration ratio, it measures 
the “oligopolistic equilibrium” by giving information about the top firms’ relative shares and their 
evolution. If the obtained series of indices (13) is monotonically descending, oligopolistic structure not 
exists, but for its existence, in contrary, indicates the first violation of descending series: ILm<ILm+1. 
Because the oligopolies, by the definition, is forming by three to four (“tight”), i.e. seven to eight firms 
(“loose”), Linda indices are calculated approximately to the tenth firm. At this manner, this indicator 
considers “nucleus” of the market, but difference in relation to CRn is very obvious. We have already 
shown the advantages of the use of Linda indices in [Буквич 2013], although this article was primarily 
illustrative. The calculations of this index are alternate and demanding. Of course, the use of personal 
computers renders the last note insignificant. 
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 The distribution of the market shares of the participants was also considered by author and 
his co-author [Bukvić and Hinić 1995] in the analysis of commodity markets in FR Yugoslavia. To the 
distribution of indicators CRi (i=1, 2, 4, 6), which were calculated on the basis of enterprises’ incomes, 
for 185 branches of commodity markets, authors identified 11 market types (from monopoly to 
competition) by the use of cluster analysis. This approach repeated author in purposes to establishing of 
types of market structures in Yugoslav food industry for the year 2000 [Буквић 2002], for all 218 
product, on whole set of indicators CRi (i=1, ... 6), which were calculated on the basis of physical 
quantum of production. In both cases for discrimination of market statuses the Euclidean distance is 
used, as most famous metrics in cluster analysis: 
 
 . (14) 
 
 Distribution of market shares is initial basis also in other approaches. One of them was used 
in the works of S. G. Svetunkov, see for example [Воробьёв и Светуньков 2016]. There new approach 
was demonstrated, which is based on the fact that (arranged) set of firms’ shares in market (4) forms 
monotonically descending function (Figure 2). This function can be presented with exponential curve 
of the Gauss type (15), with two unknown parameters (a and b), which can be estimated by the least 
square method, directly, or after previous logarithm transformation, that as result gives linear function. 
 (15) 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of firms' market shares 
 
 Denote, but, that for i=1 in (15) it follows that b=s1, and by this replacement it is to get the 
function with one parameter (16), which by logarithm transformation results in (17), wherefrom 






 . (17) 
 (18) 
 
 Coefficients b=s1 and a represent, i.e. demonstrate properties of observed distribution of 
companies’ shares in market, so they are in fact special coefficients of concentration, what is simply 
clear for parameter b without any consideration. 
 M. Kostić provided a review of the concentration index in his dissertation [Костић 2013], 
including indices (4)–(10), but his analyses do not pertain to the banking sector, he focused to the 
cooking oil and beer markets. In all other aforementioned works, excluding [Коцофана и Стажкова 
2011] and myself, the Linda index was not used, but CRn, HH and others were: reciprocity index, 
comprehensive concentration index or Horvath index (CCI), Entropy index (E-index) and the Gini 
coefficient. For our purposes, all other indices except the CRn index bear no importance. The 
Rosenbluth and Tideman-Hall indices, as well the new Svetunkov’s approach [Воробьёв and 
Светуньков 2016] was used in [Буквић 2020], but the goal of this article was other, the comparison of 
the concentration indices. 
 
 
CONCENTRATION AND COMPETITION IN THE SERBIAN BANKING SECTOR: ANALYSIS OF 
CONCENTRATION INDICES 
 
Unlike some empirical research, which divides the banking sector into small, middle and large banks, 
see for example [Bikker and Haaf 2002a], we will consider the whole sector as one set. Clearly, it 
doesn’t mean that in a theoretical sense we prefer that approach. The main reason for our choice is 
obvious enough: regardless of the relatively large number of banks, the banking and financial markets 
in Serbia are small, by all relevant indicators (see Table 3). As we can see, the exchange rate of the 
euro in this period decreased for circa 5%, so the growth of the chosen amounts presented in euro was 
some lower. Therefore, for the purposes of this work, we don’t find this division useful by any criteria. 
 
Table 3. Total assets and capital of the Serbian banks in 2016 – 30 IX 2020 
Average exchange rate of 
the euro 
31. XII. 2016 31. XII 2018 30. IX 2020 Index 2020/2016 
123.4723 118.1946 117.5803 95,2 
Total assets (dinars) 3,241,504,719 3,774,055,499 4,509,836,905 139,1 
Capital (dinars) 632,486,285 676,704,699 716,956,940 113,4 
Total assets (euros) 26,252,890.070 31,930,862.315 38,355,378.450 146,1 
Capital (euros) 5,122,495.369 5,725,343.620 6,097,594.070 119,0 
Source: Calculated on the base of Financial Statements, http://www.nbs.rs/internet/cirilica/50/50_5.html 
 
 This paper can be considered as a continuation of our research of the concentration and 
market structures in the modern Serbian banking sector. In previous works we analyzed the status in 
this sector in 2016 [Bukvić 2017], in 2017 [Bukvić 2019], and in 2018 [Bukvić 2020]. In these works 
the Linda indices were used into addition to standard coefficients (5) and (6), and lesser the other here 
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mentioned indices of concentration. The recent our work is not only renewed with data and an analysis 
for next years. We have made some new calculations by using indicators that were not used and some 
other considerations that enable better observation of the bank concentration by the variables used. 
 









2016 39,6 40,1 38,7 36,8 36,9 
2017 38,5 38,8 37,7 34,8 37,5 
2018 37,4 37,6 37,2 37,0 37,3 
2019 37,4 37,6 37,1 36,0 36,1 
I-IX 2020 36,8 36,9 37,0 34,1 36,6 
CR4 
2016 47,4 47,9 47,4 44,6 45,3 
2017 47,0 47,7 46,9 43,4 46,2 
2018 45,8 45,9 45,8 46,2 45,1 
2019 45,6 45,9 45,3 44,7 44,0 
I-IX 2020 45,0 45,1 45,9 42,2 44,2 
CR8 
2016 69,4 69,7 73,6 67,9 67,9 
2017 70,6 71,0 73,3 69,0 70,2 
2018 70,1 70,9 72,3 70,2 69,0 
2019 70,1 71,0 72,5 70,3 68,4 
I-IX 2020 70,7 71,7 72,6 70,3 69,1 
HH 
2016 813 819 882 764 763 
2017 813 818 848 762 787 
2018 779 786 807 805 771 
2019 800 814 799 791 781 
I-IX 2020 792 801 804 768 783 
Source: Based on Financial Statements, http://www.nbs.rs/internet/cirilica/50/50_5.html 
 
 The degree of concentration according to traditional indices is shown in Table 4. The CR3 
coefficients were chosen, which are used in anti-monopoly practice in many countries, as well as CR4, 
which was often used in research works in the former Yugoslavia, see [Bukvić 1999], also in the 
monograph [Begović et al. 2002], and finally CR87. The table also shows the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
indices, since the author had access to the financial statements of all the subjects, which is not always 
possible in similar analyses. 
 The CRn and HH indices are also used by the National Bank of Serbia in the aforementioned 
reviews of concentration and competition presented in the Bank’s quarterly reports, earlier in Economic 
Overview. However, due to reasons unknown to the author of this work, they do not use the CR3 and 
CR4 indices, which are justified from the standpoint of small markets and a small number of 
participants in the market, but they use the CR5 and CR10 indices instead, considering the share of 
                                                          
7
 The National Bank of Serbia uses the CR5 and CR10 coefficients in its quarterly reports. The matter of (un)justifiability of 
using one of the CRn coefficients, i.e. its informative capability in both a general case and where the Serbian banking sector 
is concerned, will remain outside our scope of consideration. 
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five, i.e. ten largest banks. We deem that the use of these indices is not adequate and argumentative, 
and we will not consider them. Instead,we can consider the results obtained from the report through the 
use of the HH index (see Table 5). 
 
Table 5. Hirschman-Herfindahl indices for chosen indicators in Serbian banking sector 2010–2019 
Balance variable 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Assets 629 660 678 741 794 796 813 813 779 800 
Loans (total) 649 722 721 774 771 763 736 788 793 789 
- to population 687 684 687 714 715 729 728 810 812 838 
- to companies 
   
788 779 782 768 812 821 840 
Deposits (total) 720 714 726 777 818 816 817 827 798 840 
- from population 796 799 811 866 903 930 939 977 967 968 
Income (total) 679 721 916 844 719 734 804 720 746 818 
- interest income 620 640 678 712 736 734 737 767 776 755 
- from fees and commissions 739 722 760 828 849 860 879 911 927 930 
Source: Банкарски сектор у Србији. Квартални извештај. (2010–2020) 
 
 All index values in Table 5 are less than 1,000, therefore the market should be by all 
indicators classified as lowly concentrated. This is constantly emphasized in the NBS reports. 
However, there is an obvious growth trend in practically all values, with a significant increase in some 
cases. In this sense, even if we ignore the problem of arbitrary limits between the different market 
concentration types, there is hardly any room for the satisfactory report estimations that are constantly 
being repeated (“The banking market in Serbia is still characterized by a satisfactory level of 
competition and a low concentration of activity”). The paper [Miljković et al. 2013], which analyzes 
the period between 2008 and 2012, demonstrated a growth trend of the HH index practically for all 
observed financial balances’ variables, with very small exceptions only in certain years and for some 
variables, so it can be concluded that there is an almost ten years’ growth trend of the HH indices in the 
Serbian banking sector. 
 In case of both coefficients (CRn and HH), the limits between different market concentration 
degrees are set arbitrarily. So, the US authority has been using HH-indices for market classifications 
since 1982. The limits in its Guidelines were set in 1997 and 210. Firstly, the limits had been set at 
1,000 and 1,800, and since 2010, they have been 1,500 and 2,500 (see Table 6). In evaluating 
horizontal mergers, the Agency (or Agencies, i.e. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission) will consider both the post-merger market concentration and the increase in concentration 
resulting from the acquisitions and mergers (see Table 6). 
 
Table 6. Degree of concentration in economy branches by HHI values (in anti-monopoly practice in USA) 
Types of market concentration In Guidelines 1997 In Guidelines 2010 
Highly concentrated markets Above 1,800 Above 2,500 
Moderately concentrated markets Between 1,000 and 1,800 Between 1,500 and 2,500 
Un-concentrated markets Below 1,000 Below 1,500 
Source: [Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 1997; Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 2010] 
 
 The anti-monopoly authority in Russia simultaneously uses both indices, CR and HH. The 
limits for the three types of market concentration are 45% and 70% for CR3 and 1,000 and 2,000 for 
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HH, which separate lowly, moderately and highly concentrated markets (see Table 7). The calculated 
values of the HH indices for all variants in our analysis are less than 1,000, so the market should be 
classified as lowly concentrated. On the other hand, according to the CR3 index, it also belongs to non-
concentrated markets, but if we were to use the CR4 index, we would have to classify the market as a 
moderately concentrated one (except for the third variant, the capital, but in that case, the value of CR4 
is practically at the limit between a non-concentrated and a moderately-concentrated market). 
 
Table 7. The classification of branch markets by level of concentration used in the anti-monopoly practice of Russia (ФАС 
Российской Федерации) 
Branch market classification Value of K3 concentration coefficient Value of Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) 
Lowly concentrated markets K3≤45% HHI≤1,000 
Moderately concentrated markets 45%<K3<70% 1,000<HHI<2,000 
Highly concentrated markets K3>70% HHI>2,000 
Source: [Федеральная антимонопольная служба, 2016] 
 
 Clearly, other possible limits between lowly, moderately and highly concentrated markets 
could result in a different classification. This is one of the main flaws of the CRn and HH index use. 
Therefore, other approaches to researching concentration and competition are also necessary. Of 
course, given the conditions that dominate our economy (smaller overall market, fewer producers in 
each production sector etc.), it turns out that this market classification by degree of concentration is 
inadequate (in nearly any kind of production the value of HHI would be in the second group), so it is 
possible and recommended that appropriate modifications in Table 6 be made. One such relatively 
successful attempt was made in the monograph [Begović et al. 2002] (see Table 8). 
 
Table 8. Degree of concentration in economic sectors by value of HHI (modified classification) 
Degree of concentration Value of HHI 
Absolutely concentrated 10,000 
Extra concentrated From 2,600 to 10,000 
Highly concentrated From 1,800 to 2,600 
Moderately concentrated From 1,000 to 1,800 
Unconcentrated markets Below 1,000 
Source: [Begović et al. 2002] 
 
 Obviously, the indices from Tables 4 and 5 show different tendencies through the times. It is, 
therefore, useful to examine the concentration by using some other indicators. In such analyses, the 
researchers also use the Gini coefficients and the Lorenz curve. So, we shaped the Lorenz curve (see 
Figure 2) for the V1, i.e. total assets in 2018. After them, we calculated these (Gini) indices for the 
observed five variables, for 2016, 2018 and 2020 (I-IX). The results are shown on Table 4. 
 As we can see, the Gini coefficients for all five variables increased from 2016 to 2018. This 
shows (undoubtedly?) that the concentration in 2018 is greater than in 2016. It may be an opposite 
result compared with the results from the use of CRn and HH coefficients. But, in 2019 and 2020 Gini 
coefficients are significantly lesser in general, that implies the decreasing of the concentration degree. 
On the other hand, a problem appears in both the Lorenz curve and the Gini coefficient, and this also 
exists in the usually used CRn and HHI coefficients. It is necessary to define in advance the limits 
whereby certain, empirically calculated concentration will be classified as high, moderate or low, or on 




Table 9. Gini coefficients for the observed indicators in 2016, 2018 and 2020 (I–IX) 
 2016 2018 2019 2020 
Total assets 0.5681 0.5808 0,5231 0.5244 
Deposits and other liabilities 0.5722 0.5856 0,5289 0.5290 
Capital 0.5833 0.5935 0,5269 0.5276 
Оperating income 0.5489 0.5855 0,5156 0.5107 
Loans and receivables 0.5544 0.5719 0,5117 0.5151 
Source: Calculation based on Financial Statements, http://www.nbs.rs/internet/cirilica/50/50_5.html 
 
 We also calculated here the other indices – Rosenbluth, Tideman-Hall, coefficient of entropy 
and coefficient of relative entropy for the same period (see Table 10). 
 
Table 10. Rosenbluth, Tideman-Hall, coefficient of entropy and coefficient of relative entropy for Serbian 
banking sector, 2016 to I –IX 2020 








2016 0.021 0.081 2.804 0.824 
2018 0.024 0.081 2.795 0.848 
2019 0.025 0.084 2.751 0.844 
2020 0.025 0.084 2.750 0.844 
Deposits 
2016 0.021 0.082 2.792 0.821 
2018 0.024 0.082 2.786 0.845 
2019 0.025 0.085 2.738 0.840 
2020 0.025 0.085 2.738 0.840 
Capital 
2016 0.021 0.084 2.759 0.811 
2018 0.024 0.084 2.769 0.840 
2019 0.025 0.085 2.751 0.844 
2020 0.025 0.085 2.750 0.844 
Operating 
income 
2016 0.021 0.077 2.850 0.838 
2018 0.024 0.082 2.782 0.844 
2019 0.025 0.083 2.769 0.850 
2020 0.025 0.082 2.774 0.851 
Loans 
2016 0.021 0.078 2.834 0.833 
2018 0.024 0.080 2.809 0.852 
2019 0.025 0.082 2.768 0.849 
2020 0.025 0.083 2.761 0.847 
Source: Calculation based on Financial Statements, http://www.nbs.rs/internet/cirilica/50/50_5.html 
 
 The result show some different tendencies. This is, also, one more reason for further 
research, i. e. for the use of other methods. 
 One of them would be the Linda indices. Unlike the previously mentioned ones, the Linda 
indices are meant to reveal the existence of oligopoly structures without using any arbitrarily 
established limits. In contrast, the index values indicate whether oligopoly is present or not in a given 
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market. In the case of a competitive market, the index value decreases (ILm>ILm+1 for all m). If this 
pattern is broken, it indicates that there is an oligopoly situation in a given market. In our case, only the 
third variant points to the existence of oligopoly, which are the Linda indices calculated on the basis of 
the capital value (see Table 11). Besides the Linda indices (V1, V2, V3, V4, and V5, for five variables 
in Table 11), it also shows the column (PE). It represents the so-called perfect equilibrium curve, which 
is the situation of perfect equality among the participants in a market. The shares of such perfect 
competitors are the same to each other, and equal to the value 1/n (n = number of market participants). 
 
Table 11. Linda indices for selected variables in Serbian banking sector in 2017 and I –IX 2020. 
Year IL  IL2 IL3 IL4 IL5 IL6 IL7 IL8 IL9 IL10 
2016 
V1  0.69 0.49 0.42 0.35 0.32 0.30 0.27 0.25 0.21 
V2  0.63 0.48 0.41 0.35 0.33 0.30 0.27 0.25 0.21 
V3  0.97 0.62 0.44 0.34 0.28 0.25 0.27 0.27 0.23 
V4  0.76 0.51 0.41 0.32 0.29 0.27 0.25 0.23 0.20 
V5  0.70 0.48 0.38 0.32 0.30 0.28 0.25 0.24 0.20 
2017 
V1  0.77 0.47 0.38 0.32 0.29 0.28 0.26 0.24 0.20 
V2  0.72 0.46 0.37 0.31 0.30 0.28 0.26 0.24 0.20 
V3  0.86 0.55 0.39 0.31 0.27 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.21 
V4  0.85 0.52 0.38 0.30 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.19 
V5  0.68 0.47 0.37 0.32 0.29 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.20 
2018 
V1  0.65 0.44 0.36 0.31 0.29 0.26 0.23 0.22 0.19 
V2  0.64 0.43 0.37 0.31 0.27 0.25 0.23 0.23 0.19 
V3  0.68 0.47 0.37 0.30 0.25 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.20 
V4  0.83 0.52 0.38 0.31 0.30 0.27 0.25 0.22 0.19 
V5  0.67 0.47 0.39 0.34 0.30 0.27 0.23 0.23 0.19 
2019 
V1  0.74 0.46 0.38 0.31 0.29 0.26 0.23 0.21 0.18 
V2  0.78 0.48 0.39 0.32 0.29 0.26 0.23 0.21 0.18 
V3  0.58 0.41 0.36 0.29 0.25 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.18 
V4  0.79 0.52 0.38 0.30 0.28 0.26 0.23 0.21 0.18 
V5  0.79 0.51 0.40 0.33 0.29 0.26 0.23 0.21 0.18 
2020 
V1  0.67 0.45 0.37 0.30 0.27 0.25 0.23 0.21 0.18 
V2  0.69 0.46 0.38 0.30 0.27 0.24 0.22 0.21 0.18 
V3  0.64 0.44 0.35 0.30 0.26 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.18 
V4  0.80 0.52 0.39 0.30 0.25 0.22 0.20 0.19 0.16 
V5  0.71 0.49 0.41 0.33 0.28 0.26 0.23 0.22 0.18 
 
PE 1 0.50 0.33 0.25 0.20 0.17 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.10 
Source: Calculation based on Financial Statements, http://www.nbs.rs/internet/cirilica/50/50_5.html 
 
 The third variant (variable X3, i.e. capital) indicates the existence of oligopoly (IL8>IL7) in 
all years: the sequence of indices ILi is not monotonically decreasing function. However, the observed 
variable (capital), as residual of assets and liabilities, is the “worst quality” variable among the chosen 
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ones. Therefore, having taken into consideration the other results from Tables 4 and 5, it could be said 
with great certainty that the results obtained by the CR3, CR4 and HH coefficients were confirmed, i.e. 
that the Serbian banking sector in the analyzed years is lowly concentrated. And this is a good 




Figure 3. Linda indices for capital and “perfect equilibrium” curve for banking sector, Serbia 2018 
Source: Based on financial statements, http://www.nbs.rs/internet/cirilica/50/50_5.html 
 
 The graphical representation of the Linda index is also of great interest (see Figure 3). We 
choose the Linda indices for capital in 2018, the figure is very illustrative. It shows indices for capital, 
where, as shown in Table 3, indicates the suspicion of oligopolistic structures. Unlike the CRn indices, 
which are a monotonically increasing function as each following participant is added 
(CR1<CR2<…<CRn), The Linda indices form a broken curve (Figure 3). The area between IL and PE 
is called the “oligopolistic arena” and it even visually shows the difference between the real situation 
and an ideal, perfect competition. 
 It is important to denote that by the use of aforementioned method of market nuclei 
[Смарагдов et al. 2015] we get the main nuclei that consist from 9, 9, 7, 9, 11 firms respectively for 
chosen five variables. This result confirms the nucleus of seven leading banks in Serbia by capital. 
 The bank shares in the total banking sector capital are shown in Figure 4. They suggest that 
the first seven banks form an oligopolistic structure – the seventh one in the range (Societe Generale) is 
greater by over 68% in terms of capital than the next, eighth one (Vojvođanska banka) (the shares are 
7.2:4.7, while in 2018 it was 6.5:3.9). If so, of course, this could be a case of a so-called loose 
oligopoly, in which, by theoretical propositions, 6–7 firms participate in a market with a 70–80% share. 
In our case, this share for the first seven firms in 2018 is 68.4% and in I –IX 2020 67.9%, very close to 
the bottom limit of theoretical loose oligopoly. Therefore, such a conclusion can be drawn. The state of 
the banking market must constantly be observed, because the values of the HH coefficients, and even 
CR4, are close to being moderately concentrated. As shown previously, the National Bank of Serbia 






Figure 4.The shares of leading banks in total banking sector capital in I–IX 2020 
Source: Based on Financial Statements, http://www.nbs.rs/internet/cirilica/50/50_5.html 
 
 At the end we calculated the parameters of the Svetunkov’s model (15), see Table 12. 
Identically for previous calculated indicators, here exist the significant differences of coefficients 
between the observed variables, as well as some lesser its divergent moves through analyzed period. 
 
Table 12. Coefficients of the Svetunkov’s model 
Total assets 2016 2018 2019 2020 
b 0.170 0.151 0.160 0.152 
a 0.168 0.149 0.173 0.172 
Deposits 2016 2018 2019 2020 
b 0.166 0.151 0.165 0.154 
a 0.173 0.149 0.177 0.176 
Capital 2016 2018 2019 2020 
b 0.196 0.157 0.142 0.149 
a 0.178 0.154 0.160 0.164 
Operating income 2016 2018 2019 2020 
b 0.164 0.171 0.163 0.155 
a 0.163 0.158 0.173 0.172 
Loans 2016 2018 2019 2020 
b 0.158 0.157 0.163 0.159 
a 0.167 0.150 0.176 0.177 
Source: Based on Financial Statements, http://www.nbs.rs/internet/cirilica/50/50_5.html 
 
 As we can see, coefficients have different values for chosen variables, and the differences not 
in the least are not significant. If we observe it moves through the analyzed period, we can conclude 
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that these differences stand greater and complicated, particularly in relation to divergent moves. It can 
be seen for each of variables itself, also for the values of coefficients, which are very different in the 





 Despite a multi annual downward trend in the number of banks, the banking market in Serbia 
is characterized by a relatively large number of banks (26). There are no prominently large banks 
among them. According to all the chosen indicators (total assets, deposits, capital, operating income 
and loans), the greatest share in 2020 (I–IX) is held by Banca Intesa 15.2; 15.4; 14.9; 15.5 and 15.9%, 
respectively. These results are somewhat lower than in 2016 (16.4; 19.6; 16.6; 17.0 and 15.8%, 
respectively). The concentration indices (CR3, CR4, HH, G, R, TH, CE, also Linda indices IL) indicate 
a low concentration degree, although close to being moderately concentrated, but also an absence of 
oligopoly, with the mentioned exception by the results of capital. Even though this does not assume the 
existence of true competition, these results point to good prospects for the creation and development of 
competition. In fact, we could state that our results in general confirm the results obtained by [Lončar 
and Rajić 2012] and [Miljković et al. 2013], which referred to three quarters of 2012, as well as those 
of [Ljumović et al. 2014], for the period between 2003 and 2012. However, we should take account of 
slight growth in concentration. It is difficult to compare the results of these works due to the differing 
approaches that were used, although the application of the HH index is a solid foundation for 
comparison in such cases. 
 Concentration in the banking sector can have many implications, among them on 
competitiveness. For that reason it is necessary, on the one hand, that regulatory bodies strictly monitor 
concentration degree trends, especially since the processes of acquisition and merger, i.e. consolidation 
of the banking sector can be expected to further intensify in the future. On the other hand, competition 
in this sector needs to be reviewed and analyzed in a more complex way, which certainly cannot be 
reduced only to the degree of concentration. As banking competition is very complex, this paper should 
be considered as one of the first analyses of concentration and competition in banking, and in the 
Serbian financial market in general. We emphasize that this research continues our dealing with 
concentration and competition in the Serbian banking sector. However, we hope that it will be a 
research subject of other researchers. New approaches would, naturally, be desirable in such future 
research. On the other side, this may be also of some interest in the comparative analysis of the 
concentration and competition in Serbian and the banking sectors of the neighboring countries, as well 
the other former socialist countries, by the use of more indicators than for example in [Barjaktarović et 
al. 2013]. 
 In addition to the fact that the concentration degree is not high despite its increase, more 
attention should be paid to the actions of banks in the market, which falls under the scope of regulation 
and control. In particular, the issues of collusion and deals between banks should be dealt with, 
although they have not been considered in this paper. 
 At the end, there is necessary to emphasize different capability of information respective 
indicators and its different discriminative power. In future research this is fact that is it undoubtedly 
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necessary particularly not to ignore. The second problem concerning to choice of variables that should 
be the basis for specification of the degree of concentration. The consideration in this article shown that 
this choice is not unimportant, as prior else mostly was believed. Therefore this choice set to future 
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